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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Actions speak louder than words, but both speak.  Our 
criminal justice system thus presumes that a person’s actions 
and words are altogether meaningful—that is, some degree of 
intentionality is inherent to them.  This presumption developed 
at a time when we were far less cognizant of the varied ways 
in which mental illness may influence conduct and speech.  In 
fact, our collective system would only recognize the role of 
mental illness in the exceedingly rare instance in which such 
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illnesses rendered a defendant incapable of intentionality.  A 
number of states have since made efforts to reflect a more 
developed understanding.  This 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas case 
stems from one such effort by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.   
 In exchange for a waiver of the right to a jury trial, 
Pennsylvania law permits a defendant to enter a special guilty 
plea, formally known as guilty but mentally ill (“GBMI”).  If 
the plea is accepted, the defendant has the opportunity to 
receive mental health treatment while serving her sentence.  
The rationale is that providing treatment where needed will 
reduce the likelihood that a defendant recidivates, which is in 
her long-term interest and protects the public from the 
attendant harms and costs of a repeat offender.  See 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 612 A.2d 426, 429–30 (Pa. 1992).   
 The waiver and entry of the plea are not enough to 
secure this opportunity, however.  This is because a trial judge 
is not permitted to accept a GBMI plea unless she examines 
certain reports, holds a hearing on the sole issue of the 
defendant’s mental illness, and determines that the defendant 
was mentally ill at the time of the offense.  If the result of this 
process is that the trial judge does not accept the GBMI plea, 
the defendant’s right to trial is returned, and she may choose to 
exercise it.   
 Appellant Anthony Velazquez was charged with 
numerous offenses arising out of two sets of incidents:  one 
involving his paramour, and the other involving a corrections 
officer.  He had a history of mental illness, so he tried to enter 
a GBMI plea.  The GBMI plea was not accepted.  The trial 
judge did not examine the requisite reports, did not hold the 
aforementioned hearing, and did not determine whether 
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Velazquez was mentally ill at the time of the offense.  But 
Velazquez’s right to trial was never returned to him.  The trial 
judge simply recorded that Velazquez had entered a normal 
guilty plea.  Trial counsel did not object to any of this. 
 Velazquez’s § 2254 habeas petition claims that 
counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment and resulted in 
his being deprived of the opportunity to plead GBMI.  The 
claim inheres two questions of first impression for this Court:  
first, whether we can exercise habeas jurisdiction where a 
petitioner merely asserts that the wrong guilty plea was entered 
and, second, whether the requisite prejudice can be shown 
where the appropriate plea would not have resulted in a 
reduced sentence.   
 The District Court misconstrued the first question and 
thus determined that it lacked habeas jurisdiction, and it never 
passed on the second.  We answer both in the affirmative.  We 
also agree with Velazquez that the assistance rendered by his 
trial counsel was constitutionally defective.  We will therefore 
vacate the District Court’s order and remand with instructions 




 Velazquez was charged on three separate Criminal 
Informations in 2008.  The allegations against him arose from 
two sets of incidents:  one involving his paramour, and the 
other involving a corrections officer.  With his paramour, he 
entered a residence and got into a physical altercation with her 
and another occupant, threatened her at his preliminary hearing 
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so that she would not testify against him, and, from prison, sent 
numerous threatening letters to her to the same effect.  With 
the corrections officer, he refused to go into a holding cell 
while he was detained.  The corrections officer “sustained 
scratches on his right arm while restraining [Velazquez] and 
attempting to place [him] back inside the cell.”  JA 208.   
 Velazquez was charged with burglary, intimidating a 
witness, terroristic threats, and harassment for the incidents 
involving his paramour.  He was charged with aggravated 
assault for the incident with the constable.  Due to Velazquez’s 
history of mental illness, his trial counsel advised him to enter 
a GBMI plea on all charges.  However, counsel was apparently 
unaware of the prerequisites for such a plea to be accepted and 
for Velazquez to have the opportunity to secure the treatment 
that is the core benefit of the plea.   
 Specifically, Pennsylvania allows “[a] person who 
waives his right to trial [to] plead [GBMI].”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 314(b) (“section 314(b)”).  But the law is express that,  
No plea of [GBMI] may be accepted by the trial 
judge until [s]he has examined all reports 
prepared pursuant to the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, has held a hearing on the sole issue of 
the defendant’s mental illness at which either 
party may present evidence and is satisfied that 
the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the 
offense to which the plea is entered.   
Id. (emphases added).  In the event that a GBMI plea is not 
accepted by the trial judge, section 314(b) provides that the 
defendant is “permitted to withdraw h[er] plea” and is “entitled 
to a jury trial . . . .”  Id.  If the GBMI plea is accepted, the 
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defendant may still have “any sentence imposed on h[er] which 
may lawfully be imposed on any defendant convicted of the 
same offense.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9727(a) (“section 
9727(a)”).  However, she has the opportunity for a hearing and 
a finding “on the issue of whether [she] . . . is severely mentally 
disabled and in need of treatment” at the time of sentencing.  
Id. (emphasis added).  The consequence of a severely-
mentally-disabled-at-sentencing finding is that the defendant 
would be provided the requisite treatment pursuant to section 
9727(b).   
 Thus, all the entry of a GBMI plea provides a defendant 
is process:  a hearing on mental illness at the time of the offense 
to determine whether the plea will be accepted and, if the plea 
is accepted, a hearing on whether the defendant is severely 
mentally disabled at the time of sentencing such that treatment 
will be provided.   
 With this as the background, Velazquez agreed to enter 
a GBMI plea and thus relinquished his right to trial, as outlined 
in section 314(b).  Entry of the plea did not proceed as section 
314(b) requires, however.  During the plea colloquy, the judge 
announced that he would go through the “guilty plea portion” 
that day, and then resolve the mentally ill aspect “most likely 
prior to the date set for sentencing . . . .”  JA 216–17.  He 
understood that “this is actually anticipated to be a [GBMI] 
plea,” JA 216, and therefore directed counsel to schedule the 
requisite hearings:  “[A]s I indicated earlier, [defense counsel] 
will be getting the medical records together for a further 
hearing with regard to [the GBMI] aspect of this plea,” JA 226.   




Correct, Judge.  It was my understanding that we 
would be having him plead guilty to the facts and 
then we would be reserving at the time of 
sentencing a possible hearing to address the 
[GBMI] and have the Court make that 
determination at that time. 
JA 217 (emphasis added).   
 The trial judge proceeded to confirm with Velazquez 
that what he sought to enter was a GBMI plea.  The judge then 
reiterated that, after taking the plea, he would hold a “further 
hearing with regard to [the GBMI] aspect of [Velazquez’s] plea 
. . .”  JA 226.  The Commonwealth’s only addition was that it 
would request a specific hearing “just on the matter of whether 
[Velazquez] will be sent to a mental health hospital or . . . a 
state correctional facility that contains a mental health 
hospital.”  JA  227.   
 Velazquez’s trial counsel did not secure the requisite 
medical records or examinations for a GBMI plea, and no 
mental health hearing was held.  He also did not object when 
the trial judge ultimately sentenced Velazquez without holding 
the hearing to which the judge initially alluded.  Nor did he 
take issue when the trial judge recorded the plea as “Guilty 
Plea,” rather than “Guilty Plea/Mentally Ill” after both the plea 
hearing and sentencing.  JA 230, 241.    
B. Procedural 
 This is the first time that a court will consider these 
errors by trial counsel, and it comes nearly a decade since 
Velazquez was sentenced.  Some explanation is warranted. 
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 The procedural framework explains the timing.  
Notably, a criminal defendant who is convicted in state court 
and who challenges his conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 is required to first do so on direct appeal—that is, up 
through the state court system until no further appeal can be 
had.  If unsuccessful on direct appeal, the defendant then has 
to exhaust the state’s collateral appeal process, where one is 
available and effective.  See § 2254(b)(1)(A) & (B)(ii).  
Pennsylvania has such a process, pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541–
46.  This process begins with a defendant’s filing a petition to 
a PCRA court and proceeds in the same manner as a direct 
appeal, ending when no further appeal can be had.  Then, and 
only then, may a defendant file a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition like 
the one here.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).  Needless to say, this 
process takes time.  The hope is that the state courts will 
identify and correct any errors before a federal court is called 
upon.   
 This hope did not manifest here.  The state courts did 
not pass on the claim before us.  Unfortunately, the likely 
explanation is oversight.  Indeed, despite the clear language of 
section 314(b) and section 9727(a), every prior court and 
lawyer involved in this matter believed that Velazquez’s 
GBMI plea was accepted by the trial judge and did not find 
error in trial counsel’s performance.   
 Neither trial counsel nor the trial judge were aware that 
there was an error with the plea.  Trial counsel’s lack of 
knowledge is further highlighted by the fact that he made no 
reference to section 314(b) on direct appeal.  Instead, he falsely 
stated that Velazquez’s GBMI plea had been accepted, which 
the trial court and the Pennsylvania Superior Court repeated.   
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 In the brief supporting his pro se petition for PCRA 
relief, Velazquez also stated that he “entered a plea of 
[GBMI].”  JA 311 ¶ 66 (emphasis added).  But, as he 
articulated it, his claim for relief was premised on what 
happened after—that is, the procedural defects in the plea 
process and trial counsel’s constitutionally defective 
performance.  He first explained that “no hearing was held on 
the mental health aspect of [his] case and the Court never made 
a finding that [he] was mentally ill at the time of the offense.”  
JA 312 ¶ 71.  In support, he quoted verbatim what section 
314(b) required, as well as what section 9727(a) required.  Id. 
¶¶ 68–69.  And, immediately thereafter, he stated that “[t]rial 
counsel did not object to the [this] defective procedure[, as he] 
did not request the Court to hold the hearings and make the 
findings required by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 
9727(a).”  Id. ¶ 72 (emphasis added).  Velazquez concluded by 
asserting that counsel “had no reasonable strategic basis for 
failing to object,” and that he “was prejudiced since there was 
no on the record finding of mental illness and . . . no finding 
that he is severely mentally disabled . . . .”  Id. ¶ 73–74 
(articulating further that the absence of these findings resulted 
in his “not receiving the programming and treatment which he 
would otherwise receive while incarcerated in the state prison 
system”).   
 His claim was nonetheless overlooked.  In a two-page 
no-merit letter,1 Velazquez’s PCRA counsel characterized 
                                                 
 1 Though not required, Pennsylvania affords counsel to 
PCRA petitioners.  A no-merit letter is a mechanism by which 
appointed PCRA counsel may seek to withdraw from 
representing a petitioner, on the basis that the petition is 
meritless.  The letter is sent to the petitioner and must detail the 
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Velazquez’s GBMI claim as only that “[Velazquez] should 
have been afforded a ‘Mental Health Hearing,’ before being 
sentenced.”  JA 332 (emphasis added).  He then reasoned that 
such a hearing was unnecessary because the Commonwealth 
withdrew its challenge to Velazquez’s GBMI status.  And he 
too ultimately averred that the “plea entered [w]as [GBMI],” 
and thus concluded that the failure to evaluate Velazquez prior 
to his sentencing did not prejudice him.  Id.  
 Velazquez challenged the letter, again stating the points 
in his pro se brief.  He added that he knew his pro se 
submissions might have been “inarticulately drafted from the 
start,” and so “expected, desired, and wished PCRA counsel 
[would] raise in an Amended PCRA petition [what had] to be 
gleaned from” his brief in support.   JA 350.     
 But this was to no avail:  the PCRA court adopted 
PCRA counsel’s framing and reasoning and ultimately 
dismissed Velazquez’s petition.  The Superior Court affirmed, 
                                                 
nature and extent of the lawyer’s review of the case, list each 
issue the petitioner wishes to have reviewed, and contain an 
explanation of why the lawyer believes that the petitioner’s 
issues are meritless.  Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213, 
215 (Pa. 1988).  The PCRA court must then “conduct[] its own 
independent review of the record” and determine whether it 
agrees that the petition is meritless.  Id. (emphasis added).  If 
so, counsel is permitted to withdraw, and the petitioner is 
allowed to proceed pro se or with the aid of private counsel.  
Id.  The federal analog is a motion pursuant to Anders v. 




adopting the PCRA court’s opinion and reasoning.  The 
District Court rejected the claim on the basis that it was not 
cognizable in federal habeas.  It also added that, because “the 
Commonwealth ultimately did not challenge [Velazquez’s] 
assertion that he was [GBMI], . . . the trial court accepted [his 
GBMI] plea without conducting a hearing.”  JA 22. 
 Velazquez appealed pro se, and counsel was later 
appointed. 
II. Discussion 
 In order to appeal the District Court’s decision as a 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petitioner, Velazquez had to first seek a 
certificate of appealability (“COA”).  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2253(c)(1)(A).  The certificate could only be issued by a circuit 
justice or judge, where Velazquez made a substantial showing 
of a denial of a constitutional right.  § 2253(c)(1) & (2).   The 
certificate would then indicate the specific issue(s) that 
satisfied the required showing.  See § 2253(c)(3).   
 Two Panels of judges on this Court construed 
Velazquez’s appeal as one such request, and ultimately granted 
the certificate for two issues:  first, whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for advising Velazquez to enter a guilty plea on the 
aggravated assault charge (“aggravated assault claim”) and, 
second, whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the defective plea procedure which resulted in 
Velazquez’s being deprived of the opportunity to enter a GBMI 
plea (“GBMI claim”).2   
                                                 
 2 In a case about the deficient performance of one 
lawyer, we pause to commend another.  The initial Motions 
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 We will grant the petition with respect to the GBMI 
claim, which obviates the need to reach the aggravated assault 
claim.3  As the Commonwealth conceded at oral argument, the 
remedy for the GBMI claim is to vacate the current judgment 
of conviction as to all charges, including the aggravated assault 
charge.  See Oral Arg. Audio 21:24–22:02.   
 Our analysis will thus consist of a determination as to:  
(A) whether we may exercise habeas jurisdiction over 
Velazquez’s GBMI claim, (B) the appropriate standard of 
review, which will include a determination as to whether the 
GBMI claim was properly exhausted in state court, and (C) (1) 
whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
defective plea procedure, and (2) whether this prejudiced 
Velazquez.   
A. Jurisdiction 
 The sole inquiry for habeas jurisdiction is whether 
“granting the petition [as to the claim] would ‘necessarily 
                                                 
Panel did not grant a COA as to Velazquez’s GBMI claim.  
Once appointed, however, counsel skillfully and diligently 
reviewed the record and moved to expand the COA to include 
this claim.  In so moving, counsel pointed out that, contrary to 
the averments by every court and lawyer before, the record 
reflected that Velazquez’s GBMI plea was not accepted.  The 
motion was granted.   
 3 The crux of the aggravated assault claim is that 
Velazquez was advised to enter a GBMI plea to all charges, 
without being informed that the Commonwealth’s case for 
aggravated assault might have been materially deficient.   
 
13 
imply’ a change to the fact, duration, or execution of the 
petitioner’s sentence.”  McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 936 
(3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).  The District Court took 
Velazquez’s characterization of the relief he sought at face 
value and determined that a claim seeking mental health 
treatment during incarceration does not imply a change to the 
fact or duration of confinement.  We view the appropriate relief 
differently and conclude otherwise. 
1.  
 At the outset, contrary to the District Court’s ruling, 
even if one concludes that a claim is not cognizable in habeas, 
the claim is not necessarily dismissed.   
 Section 2254(a) confers jurisdiction to “[t]he Supreme 
Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court” over 
habeas petitions from state prisoners.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  
The grant is limited to challenges to state-court judgments on 
“the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Consistent with prevailing Supreme Court 
precedent, we interpreted the “in custody” language as 
rendering § 2254 the exclusive mechanism for state prisoners 
to challenge the validity, the duration, and execution of their 
confinement.  Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484–86 (3d Cir. 
2001).  As a consequence, a state prisoner who attempts to 
attack the validity, duration, or execution of her sentence by 
any other means is met with dismissal of her claims.  See 
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002).  One 
rationale is to ensure that state prisoners do not evade the § 
2254 requirement that provides state courts with the 
opportunity to correct their own errors before a federal court is 
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called upon.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489–90 
(1973).   
 Conversely, we have also held that a petitioner who 
seeks habeas relief for claims that do not qualify as attacking 
the fact, duration, or execution of a sentence may not maintain 
the suit as a habeas action.  See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Royce 
v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998) (concerning a 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 petition, which also covers challenges to the 
fact, duration, and execution of a sentence); McGee, 627 F.3d 
at 934 (same).  But we do not automatically dismiss the claim 
in these instances.  Instead, we maintain that “all [the 
petitioner] has done is mislabel his suit, and either he should 
be given leave to plead over or the mislabeling should simply 
be ignored.”  Royce, 151 F.3d at 118 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381–82 
(7th Cir. 1991)); see also Leamer, 288 F.3d at 542 (suggesting 
that “an action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 is appropriate” where 
“a finding in plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or 
undo his conviction”); McGee, 627 F.3d at 934 (setting forth 
the question as whether the “petitioner . . ., a federal inmate, 
may maintain [his] suit as a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241, or whether he must re-file it as a civil rights action under 
[Bivens].” (emphasis added)). 
 Thus, a determination that a claim brought in habeas is 
not cognizable in habeas does not, by itself, end the inquiry.   
2.  
 That said, as we previously alluded, granting the 
petition with respect to the GBMI claim requires concluding 
that Velazquez’s guilty plea was invalid.  Challenges to the 
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validity of a guilty plea are among those that make up “th[e] 
traditional scope of habeas corpus.”  Preiser, 411 U.S. at 486–
87 (referencing, inter alia, Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 
(1948), which involved a challenge to the validity of a guilty 
plea).  This is true regardless of what the petitioner ultimately 
seeks to do once the plea is invalidated.  Compare Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53 (1985) (seeking to exercise the right 
to trial) with Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 138 (2012) 
(seeking to enter a different guilty plea than the one already 
entered and accepted). 
 Velazquez’s pro se filings describe the appropriate 
remedy in plain terms:  but for counsel’s errors, he would have 
received mental health treatment.  Expectedly so, this 
expression glosses over the complex legal framework at play.  
That framework provides no guarantee that either hearing—the 
one for acceptance or the one for sentencing—would have 
ended in Velazquez’s favor.  Section 314(b) contemplates that 
a hearing might result in a denial of the GBMI plea, and thus 
instructs that a defendant will then have the ability to withdraw 
his plea entirely and invoke his right to trial.  See section 
314(b).  And the benefits of section 9727(b) are contingent on 
an affirmative finding by way of section 9727(a).  See section 
9727 (a) & (b).  Reading these together, then, when Velazquez 
argues that he suffered a deprivation, he is referring to a 
deprivation of the process these provisions provided him, 
which, in substance, means the opportunity for mental health 
treatment that the process facilitates.  The appropriate remedy 
is thus not mental health treatment, albeit the object of the 
opportunity the process facilitates, but rather a restoration of 
the process itself.  The course for doing so is to vacate the 
current judgment of conviction.     
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 The Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 
U.S. 156 (2012), is instructive to this effect.  Again, the Court 
did not hesitate to exercise habeas jurisdiction where the 
defendant had been convicted and sentenced, but argued that 
plea counsel’s ineffective assistance led him to decline the 
previous plea offer.  See id. at 173.  More importantly, the 
remedy was not an alteration of the defendant’s sentence to 
reflect what he would have received had the appropriate plea 
been entered.  Id. at 170–71 (explaining that this is the remedy 
only in cases in which “the sole advantage a defendant would 
have received under the plea is a lesser sentence” (emphasis 
added)).  Rather, the Court fashioned a remedy that would 
provide the defendant the opportunity of which he was 
deprived—that is, the opportunity to accept the prior plea offer.  
See id at 174–75.  To do so, the Court ordered the State of 
Michigan to reoffer the plea agreement that the defendant 
previously turned down on counsel’s advice.  Id. at 174.  And, 
“[p]resuming [the defendant] accept[ed],” the Court left it to 
the state trial courts to determine whether to vacate the 
[defendant]’s conviction and resentence him pursuant to the 
plea agreement.  Id. (emphasis added).  In sum then, for these 
purposes, the Court restored the state of the world to what it 
would have been had plea counsel never been constitutionally 
defective.   
 Though not the same remedy, the same approach is 
warranted here.  Indeed, the Lafler Court only needed to ensure 
the plea agreement’s re-offer in order to restore the state of the 
world absent plea counsel’s constitutionally defective 
performance.  A slightly different remedy is due if the same 
state of the world is to be approximated in our case.  This is 
because Pennsylvania does not provide its courts the role seen 
in Lafler when it comes to GBMI pleas.  See Frye, 566 U.S. at 
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150 (“States have the discretion to add procedural protections 
under state law if they choose.”).  Its statutory scheme 
mandates a particular course by its trial courts.  This includes 
a hearing to determine whether a GBMI plea is accepted, and 
then, if it is not, that the defendant may insist on going to trial.  
As a result, maintaining the judgment of conviction pursuant 
to the defective plea and leaving it to the trial judge’s discretion 
would be contrary to state law.  Instead, a faithful application 
of the law counsels vacating the current judgment of conviction 
and permitting Velazquez to take advantage of the process the 
law affords him.  This is the course we will take.   
 As such, Velazquez’s pro se characterizations 
notwithstanding, this case necessarily implies a change to the 
fact of his conviction, and thus should be resolved within the 
parameters of habeas.  
B. Standard of Review 
 We review the District Court’s and state court’s 
decisions on Velazquez’s GBMI claim de novo.  The District 
Court’s decision because it did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing.  See McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 
81, 83 (3d Cir. 2007); Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 758 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  And the state court decision because the state 
courts did not adjudicate the claim on the merits, despite its 
being properly exhausted.  See Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 
597, 605–06 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 There is no dispute that the state courts did not 
adjudicate Velazquez’s GBMI claim on the merits.  Trial 
counsel did not raise the claim on direct appeal.  PCRA counsel 
falsely averred that Velazquez’s GBMI plea was in fact 
accepted, and thus construed the claim as only speaking to 
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section 9727(a).  The PCRA and Superior Courts did the same.  
As a result, the state courts “misunderstood the nature” of 
Velazquez’s claim, and failed to adjudicate it on the merits.  
Chadwick, 312 F.3d at 606.  
 The Commonwealth appears to concede that there is no 
state court decision on the merits of the claim before us.  
However, it initially argued that this is because Velazquez 
failed to present his claim to the state courts, not because it was 
misconstrued.  If successful, the consequence of this argument 
would have been twofold:  (1) it would have meant that 
Velazquez failed to exhaust his GBMI claim, which warrants 
dismissal unless he could establish cause and prejudice, and (2) 
regardless of whether he could establish cause and prejudice 
for his failure to exhaust, the state court decision would be 
entitled to Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
deference.4     
 Neither consequence is warranted.  The 
Commonwealth’s failure-to-exhaust argument was always a 
nonstarter.  Our jurisprudence merely requires a petitioner to 
give the state courts the “opportunity to pass on the merits of a 
claim.”  Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  That opportunity was provided here.  The crux of 
the claim before us is whether counsel was ineffective for 
                                                 
 4 This means we would have only been able to grant 
relief from the state court’s decision if it was “contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States,” id. at § 2254(d)(1), or involved an “unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding,” id. at § 2254(d)(2).  
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failing to object to a defective plea procedure, and whether this 
resulted in Velazquez being relegated to a normal guilty plea.  
Velazquez’s initial pro se brief is representative of the ways in 
which his filings provided ample basis to pass on the merits of 
this claim.   
 In it, he presents what section 314(b) required for a plea 
to be accepted, what it required in the event that a plea was not 
accepted, and what section 9727(a) and (b) provide in the event 
that a plea was accepted.  He then explains that trial counsel 
was deficient for failing to object to the trial judge’s failure to 
apply the procedures required by both.  Along with that 
accurate description of the defects in the plea procedure, the 
state courts had in their possession the plea transcript and the 
plea documents, both of which corroborated the clear 
implication of Velazquez’s argument:  the GBMI plea was not, 
and could not have been, accepted.   
 The Commonwealth’s initial view was that Velazquez’s 
false averment that his GBMI plea had in fact been accepted 
changed the claim in its entirety.  That is, rather than the claim 
before us, Velazquez presented to the state courts the separate 
claim that he was deprived of a hearing for mental health 
treatment purposes.  We are not persuaded.  And, as it turns 
out, nor was the Commonwealth.  It conceded at argument that 
the claim was exhausted for substantially the reasons we have 
set forth.  Oral Arg. Audio 19:38–49 (conceding that 
Velazquez articulated a section 314(b) defect “every step of the 
way”).5   
                                                 
 5 The Commonwealth’s remaining argument on this 
issue was that the state courts’ failure to consider the claim 
prejudiced it because it could not develop a record regarding 
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 We will therefore reach the merits of Velazquez’s 
claim, and our review is de novo. 
C. Merits 
 On the merits, Velazquez claims that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the defective plea process 
and, as a result, he was denied the opportunity to plead GBMI.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the 
framework for analyzing such a claim.  The operative inquiry 
is twofold:  first, whether counsel was in fact ineffective and, 
second, if so, whether counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced 
Velazquez.  We answer both in the affirmative. 
1.  
 The ineffectiveness inquiry centers on whether “counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  
United States v. Bui, 795 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation 
omitted).  This requires a showing that “counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
                                                 
the advice trial counsel gave Velazquez.  Oral Arg. Audio 
20:15–33.  Even if we concluded that this somehow factors into 
whether the claim was exhausted in the first instance—which 
it does not—Velazquez’s claim centers on trial counsel’s 
failure to object to a defective plea procedure, not on any 
advice that trial counsel provided him.  As a result, the record 
contains all that is relevant, which consists of the process 
Pennsylvania law requires, the failure to provide Velazquez 




reasonableness.”  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 57).   
 This standard is easily met here.   It is well established 
that “[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is 
fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform 
basic research on that point is a quintessential example of 
unreasonable performance under Strickland.”  Hinton v. 
Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014).  There is ample basis in 
the record to conclude that trial counsel was ignorant of the 
GBMI-plea procedures prescribed by Pennsylvania law.  He 
concurred in the trial judge’s suggestion that he would procure 
the necessary records and facilitate the requisite hearing, but 
failed to assure that this procedure was followed and failed to 
verify that the plea documents reflected the plea his client 
sought to enter.  This falls below the performance expected of 
the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
2.  
 Velazquez’s case for prejudice is that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 
have entered a GBMI plea.  Appellant’s Op. Br. 28.  
Importantly, Pennsylvania law is clear that a GBMI plea will 
not operate to reduce the sentence of a defendant.  See section 
9727(a).  This case thus presents a question of first impression 
for our Court:  whether Strickland prejudice can be established 
in the plea context where there is no showing that the length of 
the petitioner’s sentence will be affected.   
 Traditional inquiry for prejudice in the plea context is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
errors, the petitioner would have foregone a guilty plea and 
insisted on trial.  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (describing the inquiry as 
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“focus[ing] on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective 
performance affected the outcome of the plea process” 
(emphasis added)).  The proliferation of plea bargaining led the 
Supreme Court to expand this inquiry to cover instances in 
which the deprivation of the right to trial was not the concern, 
but rather the opportunity to enter a different guilty plea.  See 
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163–69 (stating that the fact that defendants 
“have no right to be offered a plea . . . nor a federal right that 
the judge accept it . . . is beside the point” (first alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frye, 566 
U.S. at 148)).  However, the Court required that there be a 
showing as to whether the other plea would have been 
available, accepted by both the petitioner and the court, and, 
importantly, that the other plea offered “less severe” terms than 
the “judgment and sentence” that was in fact imposed.  Lafler, 
566 U.S. at 163–64 (emphasis added); Frye, 566 U.S. at 148–
49 (same).   
 It is not clear that Velazquez would have met this 
standard.  The record demonstrates that the GBMI plea was 
available, Velazquez attempted to enter it, and the trial judge 
sought to accept it.  But, as the Commonwealth points out, 
nothing suggests that the claim’s acceptance would have 
resulted in a finding that Velazquez was severely mentally ill 
at the time of sentencing.  Equally, it is not clear that the mental 
health treatment that would result from such a finding would 
qualify as “less severe” terms than Velazquez’s present 
sentence, given that the length of the sentence would not 
change. 
 To Velazquez’s benefit, however, the Hill inquiry has 
since been expanded in three subsequent cases that are binding 
on our Court.  This began with our precedential decision in 
Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841 (3d 
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Cir. 2017).  The case involved an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim where the petitioner had been advised to forgo 
his right to a jury trial and to opt for a bench trial.  Id. at 844–
46.  In determining the operative prejudice inquiry, the Vickers 
Panel labeled the inquiry set forth in Hill the “process-based 
analysis.”  Id. at 856.  This was because the Hill inquiry did not 
involve examining the petitioner’s likelihood of success had he 
insisted on trial, but merely whether he would have gone to 
trial at all—that is, whether he would have taken advantage of 
the process of which he was deprived.  See id. at 855.   
 In contrast, our prior precedent for waivers of the right 
to jury trial required a showing that the jury trial would have 
resulted in a more favorable outcome than the bench trial.  See 
United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008).  The 
Vickers Panel overturned this precedent on the basis that Lafler 
confirmed that Hill’s process-based analysis ought to govern.  
See Vickers, 858 F.3d at 857.6  It then defined the proper 
                                                 
 6 The Panel explained that:  
Our holding regarding the appropriate prejudice 
inquiry in this context, which merely 
aligns Lilly with the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision in Lafler, does not 
necessitate en banc review.  As occurs from time 
to time, ‘a panel of our Court may decline to 
follow a prior decision of our Court without the 
necessity of an en banc decision when the prior 




prejudice inquiry as “whether the defendant can demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, 
he would have opted to exercise [the] right [at issue].”  Id. 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the view espoused in 
Vickers less than a month later in Lee v. United States, 137 S. 
Ct. 1958 (2017), and more recently in Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. 
Ct. 738 (2019).  In Lee, the petitioner was an immigrant who 
had been incorrectly advised that his acceptance of a plea offer 
would not have any immigration consequences.  137 S. Ct. at 
1962–63.  The petitioner in Garza’s requests to counsel to file 
a notice of appeal on his behalf had been denied by counsel on 
the basis that his plea agreements included two waivers of the 
right to appeal.  139 S. Ct. at 742–43.  The Supreme Court 
found prejudice in both instances.  Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967 
(examining solely whether the petitioner “ha[d] adequately 
demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have 
rejected the plea had he known that it would lead to mandatory 
deportation”); Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746–48 (citing Lee, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1966–67, as supporting the proposition that, “when 
deficient counsel causes the loss of an entire proceeding, [the 
Court] will not bend the presumption-of-prejudice rule simply 
because a particular defendant seems to have had poor 
prospects” (emphasis added)).   
 Critically, it was clear that the right or opportunity of 
which the petitioners were deprived would not amount to a 
more favorable outcome, and certainly not one in the form of a 
lesser sentence.  Indeed, in Lee, the Court acknowledged that 
the plea that would be vacated “carried a lesser prison sentence 
                                                 
Vickers, 858 F.3d at 857 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Tann, 
577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
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than [the petitioner] would have faced at trial,” and that the 
petitioner “had no real defense to the charge” against him.  Lee, 
137 S. Ct. at 1962 (emphasis added).  Similarly, in Garza, the 
Court acknowledged that the merits of the issues the petitioner 
wanted to raise on appeal were irrelevant; the only inquiry in 
the Court’s view was whether the petitioner would have 
exercised his right to appeal, “with no need for a further 
showing of his claims’ merit.”  139 S. Ct. at 747 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 The combined effect of Vickers, Lee, and Garza is that 
petitioners alleging ineffective assistance of counsel resulting 
in a deprivation of process need not show that the decision to 
undergo the process would have resulted in a more favorable 
outcome.  Instead, they need only demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s error(s), they would have 
made the decision—that is, chosen to exercise the right or take 
advantage of the opportunity of which they were deprived.    
 As a result, Velazquez does not need to demonstrate that 
his GBMI plea is likely to be accepted or that a favorable 
finding of severe mental illness will result.  Nor does he need 
to demonstrate that the outcome of the two findings will be a 
lesser sentence.  We will find prejudice if there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for trial counsel’s failure to object to the 
defective plea procedure, Velazquez would have taken 
advantage of the process of which he was deprived.  The record 
is unequivocal that this is the case.  The only hindrance to 
Velazquez’s efforts to enter a GBMI plea was the 





* * * * * 
 In sum, we exercise habeas jurisdiction and review the 
District Court’s and state court’s decisions on Velazquez’s 
GBMI claim de novo.  We conclude that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance, and that Velazquez was prejudiced as a 
result.  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s order and 
remand with instructions to grant the petition for the writ with 
respect to Velazquez’s GBMI claim.  The grant shall vacate 
Velazquez’s present judgment of conviction. 
